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1For decades, many Arab countries have been dominated by dictators who restricted political
liberties, controlled economic resources, and ignored social problems. As a result, a feeling of
discontent and frustration built up over the years among citizens, especially the youth. The Arab
Spring, named after the largely unanticipated public demonstrations aimed at replacing autocratic
regimes by democratic systems across several Arab countries, has been considered by many as one
of the political landmarks of the twenty-first century.1 The Arab Spring was sparked on December
17, 2010 by the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian fruit vendor, after the police
confiscated his vegetable cart and humiliated him. This event was the catalyst for large-scale
protests that eventually toppled Zine El Abidine Ben-Ali’s 24-year reign on January 2011. The
winds of change that swept across Tunisia triggered a domino effect in several Arab countries,
including Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen.
Notwithstanding the worldwide interest in the Arab Spring, to the best of our knowledge there
are almost no studies that have quantified its economic impact. In this paper, we use the Synthetic
Control Methodology (SCM) as developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) to estimate the
macroeconomic impact of the Arab Spring on the Tunisian economy from 2011 to 2013. The paper
also contributes to the literature on the economic impact of conflicts and revolutions.
The Synthetic Control Method creates a synthetic control (counterfactual) as a weighted
average of other control units (in this case countries) that were not affected by the treatment (in
this case the Arab Spring), such that the outcome and characteristics of the treated unit and its
synthetic counterpart are as similar as possible during the pre-shock period. Our “Synthetic
Tunisia,” which is our counterfactual for Tunisia in the absence of the Arab Spring, is constructed
using data between 1990 and 2010. The effect of the Arab Spring is then estimated by comparing
data for actual and Synthetic Tunisia in the period 2011–13.
The main results of this paper are as follows. The Arab Spring had a negative effect on Tunisia’s
aggregate economy: per capita GDP was lower than that of Synthetic Tunisia by an estimated US$
600 (5.5 percent), US$ 574 (5.1 percent) and US$ 735 (6.4 percent) in 2011, 2012, and 2013,
respectively. Thus, in the first year (2011) the loss was already substantial, and, by 2013, the
shortfall had increased somewhat further. In addition, the main channel through which the Arab
Spring adversely impacted the Tunisian economy was through investment.
To assess the robustness of our results, we perform various additional tests. In the SCM, it is
typically the case that only a minority of the candidate control units end up with non-zero weights,
so first we check if our results might be sensitive to the omission of the included countries. We find
that excluding any of these control countries does not alter the path of the baseline Synthetic
Tunisia after 2010. In addition, we perform what are known as time series falsification tests, to
check that, if we applied the methodology at earlier dates than 2010 when Tunisia did not experience
a shock, the SCM correctly identifies no shock effect after these dates (2000 and 2008). We find that
our results are robust as Tunisia’s per capita GDP did not drop relative to its synthetic counterpart
after 2000 or after 2008. The construction of Synthetic Tunisia obviously depends on the criteria
used to make it similar to actual Tunisia in the pre-shock period, so we also investigate the effect of
amending these criteria. Finally, we compare our results with alternatives based on regression
analysis. The outcome of all these tests is to confirm the robustness of our results. However, we
fully acknowledge the limitations of our study as the SCM does not fully account for unobserved
factors and possible idiosyncratic shocks that might have occurred around or after the Arab Spring.
A particular concern is the high level of oil prices in the years 2011 to 2013 relative to the
previous decade. As we discuss in section 6, it is possible that this could have affected Synthetic
1. “Not since the collapse of the Berlin wall and the demise of the Soviet Union has change swept so suddenly across
a geographical region” (e-International Relations 2011: 3).
2Tunisia through asymmetric or non-linear effects on oil exporters and oil importers, even though
Synthetic Tunisia, like actual Tunisia, was in approximate balance on its oil trade. Moreover, to the
extent that the high oil prices of this period can be attributed to interruptions in supply associated
with the Arab Spring, the control group may not have been immune to the shock as our
methodology assumes. On the other hand, world oil production does not appear to have fallen
significantly below trend after the Arab Spring. Increased output from Saudi Arabia compensated
for reduced supply from Libya, so the role of the Arab Spring in the high oil prices is unclear. In our
results, GDP per capita in Synthetic Tunisia follows a fairly smooth trend with no sign that 2011
marks a major economic shock caused by higher world oil prices.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the main political
developments that happened in Tunisia in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Section 3 briefly
reviews the relevant literature on the economic cost of conflicts. Section 4 describes the empirical
methodology and the data used while section 5 presents the results. This is followed by section 6,
which includes some robustness checks. Section 7 determines the main channel through which the
economy was impacted by the Arab Spring. Section 8 concludes.
I. MAJOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN TUNISIA AFTER THE ARAB SPRING
The Tunisian revolution2 was sparked by the self-immolation of Mr. Mohammed Bouazizi, a street
vendor, on December 17, 2010. Bouazizi’s suicide was followed by a series of uprisings that spread
quickly across Tunisia after 21 Tunisians were killed by government snipers in the province of
Kasserine (Gelvin 2015). These uprisings, which demanded the departure of President Ben Ali, were
successful in ousting him after the army stood down on January 13, 2011. Since then, Tunisia’s
political transition has experienced three distinct periods as documented by Kerrou (2013). The first
phase stretched from January 14, 2011, when the reign of President Ben Ali came to an end after 24
years in power, to October 23, 2011, when a new National Constituent Assembly was elected. This
period was characterized by the formation of a new government headed by Beji Caid Essabi and the
election of a National Constituent Assembly.
The second phase, from 2012 until the end of 2013, was marred by a political crisis between the
secular opposition represented by the National Salvation Front (NSF) and the Islamic-led
government dominated by El-Nahda party. For example, in August 2012, thousands protested in
Tunis, the capital of Tunisia, against the cabinet’s decision to reduce women’s rights. The tension
intensified, however, in the aftermath of the assassination of Chokri Belaïd, an important figure of
the Tunisian opposition, on February 6, 2013. This was followed by violent clashes between police
and protesters when commemorating, on April 9, 2013, the martyr’s day as well as the assassination
of opposition figure Mohamed Brahmi. These events incited several strikes and calls for the
government’s resignation.
The third and final period was characterized by the ending of the political crisis and building
the foundations of a sustainable democratic and inclusive political system. In October 2013, the El-
Nahda party agreed to form a caretaker government of technocrats assigned with organizing new
elections in 2014. As a result, a consensus was reached in December 2013 between the main civil
society institutions and major political parties on a blueprint to accomplish a democratic transition
process that included the nomination of a new non-politically affiliated government. The parliament
approved a new constitution in January 2014 along with the formation a non-partisan technocratic
government headed by Mehdi Jomaa. Then, in October 2014, parliamentary elections took place
and Nidaa Tunis, the main secular party in Tunisia, secured the most seats followed by El-Nahda
party. The transition to a democratic system was finalized in December 2014 when presidential
2. The Tunisian revolution is also referred to as the “Jasmine” revolution.
3elections were held and Beji Caid Essebsi, the candidate of Nidaa Tunis, won the presidential
elections against Mouncef Al-Marzouki.3
From an economic perspective, the drop in growth rates induced the central bank to adopt an
expansionary monetary policy aimed at boosting economic growth by: (i) lowering its key interest
rate by 100 basis points (bps) between May and September 2011; (ii) reducing the reserve
requirement ratio of commercial banks from 12 to 2 percent; and (iii) giving US$ 2.6 billion to
commercial banks in order to boost liquidity. From the fiscal side, the government implemented a
4.7 percent increase on civil servants’ wages in 2011 while security forces were provided with
additional benefits. As a result, the wage bill increased as a share of GDP from 10.7 percent in 2010
to 12.4 percent in 2013. Moreover, transfers and subsidies increased from 3.6 percent of GDP prior
to the revolution to 7.6 percent in 2013.
In addition to the high youth unemployment rate (27 percent in 2010) and large regional
disparities, the Tunisian economy was particularly plagued by high levels of corruption prior to
2011. According to Rijkers et al. (2014: 24), “Enterprises with direct ownership links to the Ben Ali
family confiscated in the aftermath of the revolution accounted for 3% of all private sector output
and appropriate approximately a fifth of all private sector profits. The disproportionate aggregate
contribution of Ben Ali firms reflects their superior performance.” Despite establishing a Good
Governance and Anti-Corruption Commission in the new constitution that was ratified in 2014,
corruption seems to have escalated following the uprisings. A recent poll by Transparency
International (2016) reveal that 64 percent of Tunisians saw a rise in corruption compared to the
previous year.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Dating back to the 19th and 20th centuries, researchers have been interested in understanding the
relation between economic dynamics and conflict. For example, von Clausewitz (1812) focused
primarily on the relation between economic conditions and the capacity to prosecute a war while
Lenin (1916) looked at the relation between fragile economic fundamentals and the probability of a
conflict. While the political turmoil in Tunisia was not an armed conflict, estimating the economic
impact of lower-level internal conflicts belongs to the same strand of literature as quantifying the
impact of large-scale civil wars. According to Skaperdas et al. (2009), strikes, protests, and road
blockades, which all fall under the category of low-level conflicts, are common examples of conflicts
that could have disruptive impacts on the economy similar to those of armed conflict. Empirical
research in this field is divided into two closely related categories: (i) the causes/correlates of
conflicts4; and (ii) the economic consequences of conflicts. For the purpose of this paper, we will
briefly review the literature on the latter.5
The literature regarding the economic cost of conflicts originated with the work of Organski and
Kugler (1977), who examined the impact of World Wars I and II on European economies. Since
3. The relation between economic development and democratization is one of the most studied issues in the
political science literature. Boix (2003), Boix and Stokes (2003), and Epstein et al. (2006) have all argued in favor of the
modernization theory: higher income per capita causes political regimes to transition to democracies. On the other hand,
Przeworski (2000) argued that “democratic transitions occur randomly, but once there, countries with higher levels of
GDP per capita remain democratic” (Epstein et al. (2006, p. 551). In the case of the Arab Spring, we favor the latter
explanation as Tunisia, which, in 2010 had a GDP per capita of US$ 10,768, and Yemen, which in the same year had a
per capita GDP of US$ 3,663, were both under similar dictatorships.
4. Extensive reviews of the theoretical methodologies used in the literature to model the causes of conflicts can be
found in chapter 3 of Blattman and Miguel (2010) and chapter 3 of Collier and Hoeffler (2007a).
5. For more details about the literature tackling the causes of civil wars, the reader is referred to Sambanis (2001),
Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon (2004), Sambanis and Hegre (2006), Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008), and Bleaney and
Dimico (2011) among others. A recent survey of the causes and correlates of civil wars can be found in chapter 9 of the
Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict (2012).
4then, an extensive literature has emerged trying to quantify the impact of conflicts on economic
outcomes across different countries and periods. Different techniques have been adopted in the
literature to calculate the economic costs of conflicts.6
The cost accounting method is based on summing all the direct and indirect costs of conflicts.
Examples are Bilmes and Stiglitz (2006), who used it to estimate the economic cost of the Iraqi war
for the United States, and Arunatilake et al. (2001), who applied it to the Sri Lanka civil war from
1984 to 1996. Regression methods have been applied in various ways. Venieris and Gupta (1986)
and Alesina and Perotti (1996) investigated the effect of measures of social and political instability
on savings and investment respectively. Cross-country panel data have been used by Collier (1999),
Blomberg et al. (2004), and Hoeffler and Reynal-Querol (2003) to estimate the impact of conflict on
GDP growth. Time series methods such as Vector Autoregression (VAR) models have been
employed by Enders and Sandler (1991) to estimate the impact of transnational terrorist attacks on
the number of tourist arrivals in Spain between 1970 and 1988. Finally, Besley and Mueller (2012)
relied on a Markov switching model to quantify the impact of peace dividend in Northern Ireland
proxied by changes in house prices.7
In recent years, a new methodology, called the Synthetic Control Method (SCM), has been used
to estimate the impact of conflicts. In our context, the SCM involves the choice of a synthetic
control, constructed as a weighted average of other countries selected to resemble as closely as
possible the pre-shock features of Tunisia, to estimate what would have happened to the Tunisian
economy in the absence of the Arab Spring. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) were the first to use
this methodology in order to quantify the output forgone due to conflicts. Specifically, they analyzed
the economic costs of the conflict of the Basque region of Spain from 1975 to 1997 by constructing
a synthetic region composed of two other Spanish regions (Catalonia and Madrid) as a
counterfactual. Based on this counterfactual, they concluded that per capita GDP in the Basque
region fell by around ten percent compared to what would have been the case if the conflict did not
occur. For recent applications of SCM to a variety of issues, see Abadie et al. (2010), Billmeier and
Nannicini (2013), Campos et al. (2014), and Abadie et al. (2015).
Two recent studies have attempted to quantify the impact of the Arab Spring. 8 The World Bank
(2013) used a VAR model to examine the impact of the Syrian conflict (captured by an exogenous
dummy variable) on the Lebanese economy between 2012 and 2014. They found that investment
and consumption dropped 1.2 and 2.6 percent, respectively, as a result of the Syrian conflict. Second,
Ianchovichina and Ivanic (2014) examined the economic effects of the Syrian war and the rise of the
Islamic State on Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey. In particular, they employed a
global, computable general-equilibrium model to quantify the output lost due to trade disintegration
as a result of the Arab Spring. Their simulations suggested that all six countries were adversely
impacted by these conflicts, with Syria and Iraq bearing the brunt of the losses.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we present the main building blocks of the SCM, which we will adopt to estimate
the economic cost of the Arab Spring on Tunisia’s economy. After that, we describe the data.
6. Extensive reviews of the different techniques are provided by De Groot et al. (2009), Gardeazabal (2010), and
Skaperdas et al. (2009).
7. In addition to the econometric techniques, the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP 2013) and Fearon and
Hoeffler (2014) used other methods to estimate the economic cost of conflicts.
8. Regarding the causes of the Arab Spring, Campante and Chor (2012) found evidence that the expansion of
education in the Arab world have contributed to the uprisings. In addition, Arampatzi et al. (2015) found that life
dissatisfaction appears to have played a significant role in the outburst of the Arab revolutions.
5Theoretical Basis
The SCM, as developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010),9 creates a
synthetic control (counterfactual), as a weighted average of other control units (representing
countries, states, or regions) that were not affected by the treatment (representing shocks, events,
or interventions), such that the outcome (in this case per capita GDP) of the synthetic control and
that of the treated unit are the same during the pre-treatment period. After constructing the
appropriate synthetic control, the causal impact of the treatment is simply calculated as the
difference between the outcome of the treated and that of the synthetic control in the post-treatment
period.
In our case, we have panel data from Tunisia and ܴ other countries from 1990 to 2013 (24 years),
where ܴ is a set of countries that were not affected by the Arab Spring (hereinafter referred to as
controls). The per capita GDP of the real Tunisia (ܩܦ ௧ܲ௨௡;௧) and of a Synthetic Tunisia (ܩܦ ௦ܲ௬௡;௧ ),
constructed as described below, are compared for the period after the Arab Spring, and the impact
in each year is measured as the difference between them.
The GDP per capita of Synthetic Tunisia is constructed as follows. Let ܺ௥ be an (ݔ× 1) vector
of observed covariates (or characteristics) correlated with real GDP per capita (outcome of interest)
for every control country ݎ∈ ܴ.10 In addition, consider a vector of weights ܹ = (ݓଵ, … ,ݓோ) such
that ݓ௥∈ோ ≥ 0 and ∑ ݓ௥ோ௥ୀଵ = 1. Each particular combination of ܹ will yield a different synthetic
control for Tunisian GDP per capita during the pre-Arab Spring (pre-AS) period. Abadie et al.












ܺ௥;௧= ܺ௧௨௡;௧ ݋݂ݎݐ= 1990, … ,2010 (2)
the synthetic control estimator, ݉ܫ ݌ܽܿ ݐ௧, ݋݂ݎݐ= 2011, … ,2013 is unbiased. Therefore, the vector
of optimal weights ܹ ∗ = (ݓଵ∗, … ,ݓோ∗)′ assigned to each control country, ݎ∈ ܴ, is estimated by
minimizing the difference between the vectors of pre-AS (before 2011) covariates and real GDP per
capita of Tunisia on the one hand and the respective vectors corresponding to the Synthetic Tunisia
on the other hand.11 In simple terms, the optimal Synthetic Tunisia should not only have the same
GDP per capita as Tunisia during the pre-AS period but it should also have the same values of the
covariates (in this case, measures of the structure of the economy and social indicators).
After finding the optimal weights that satisfy equations (1) and (2) the real GDP per capita for
the Synthetic Tunisia is estimated using
ܩܦܲ෣ ௌ௬௡௧௛;௧ = ෍ ݓ௥∗ோ
௥ୀଵ
ܩܦ ௥ܲ;௧ ݋݂ݎݐ= 1990, … ,2013. (3)
9. For a detailed methodology of the synthetic control model and the corresponding mathematical derivations see
Abadie et al. (2010).
10. The vector of covariates will be defined later in the Data section.
11. To perform this minimization, we used the “synth” package developed by Abadie et al. (2010) for STATA. A
brief description on how to use the synth command can be found in the supplemental appendix available alongside the
published version of this paper.
6The impact of the Arab Spring on Tunisia’s per capita GDP can then be calculated as follows:
݉ܫ ݌ܽ ܿݐ௧= ܩܦ ௧ܲ௨௡;௧− ܩܦܲ෣ ௌ௬௡௧௛;௧ ݋݂ݎݐ= 2011, … ,2013. (4)
In other words, the economic impact of the Tunisian revolution is equal to the difference, over
the period 2011-2013, between the actual Tunisian GDP per capita and the estimated counterfactual
GDP per capita had the Arab Spring not happened.
Before proceeding to describe the data, we should note that SCM depends on the following four
assumptions. First, the exogenous shock affecting the treated unit should have no impact on the
outcome of the control units during the post-treatment period, otherwise we will have a biased
estimate. Second, and in order to control for possible unobserved factors affecting the outcome
variable, Abadie et al. (2010) argue that increasing the number of pre-intervention periods reduces
the likelihood of a bias stemming from unobserved variables. Third, the shock itself must, by
definition, be exogenous and largely unexpected ex-ante, otherwise there might be some
anticipation effects resulting in reverse causation (Billmeier and Nannicini- 2013). Fourth, and
foremost, the synthetic control should have, approximately, the same structural characteristics
(predictors of the outcome variable) as the treated unit during the pre-treatment period. If potential
control units are not structurally similar to the treated unit we are interested in, then any difference
between the outcome of the two series (treated and its synthetic counterpart) may only be due to
structural breaks rather than from the exogenous shock itself (George and Benet [2005[ and
Geddes [2003]).
Compared with traditional empirical methods used in the literature to estimate the economic
impact of conflicts/revolutions, the SCM has several advantages. First, the SCM can be used in
situations where time series regressions (VAR or VECM models) fail due to data limitations such
as a relatively small number of time series observations. For example, in our case, we only have
quarterly data for Tunisian GDP from Q1-2000 to Q4-2014, which only gives us 60 observations.
The SCM method overcomes this problem. Second, and in contrast to constructing counterfactuals
based on linear trends or using forecasts, counterfactuals constructed using the SCM capture global
economic shocks that may occur in the post-treatment period. Third, Abadie et al. (2010) showed
that the SCM is a generalization of the Difference-in-Difference (DiD) method used in micro-
econometrics to evaluate the impact of a treatment on an aggregate outcome. However, unlike DiD,
which only accounts for time-invariant effects, the SCM captures the effects of time-changing
unobservable variables.
Data
To construct Synthetic Tunisia, we use country-level panel data for Tunisia and all the other 182
countries available in the 2015 version of the World Development Indicators (WDI) published by
the World Bank from 1990 to 2010.12 Given that the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is
recognized internationally to be the best reliable measure of the state of the economy, it will be used
as the outcome variable. In particular, we use the GDP per capita adjusted to PPP at 2011 constant
prices, which we refer to in the rest of the paper as GDP per capita also downloaded from the WDI
database.
12. Ideally, we would have restricted our set of potential control units to countries in the MENA region that share
similar characteristics with Tunisia (such as language, culture and weather). However, this is not feasible as most
MENA countries have been impacted by the Arab Spring, and, therefore, we would not be able to construct a synthetic
Tunisia. Consequently, our set of controls consisted of the global sample of economies, “as this helps to regain
comparable GDP levels in the comparison countries” (Billmeier and Nannicini 2013: 992).
7As explained earlier, suitable control countries should not have been exposed to a major
exogenous shock from 2011 onwards, otherwise these may impact the per capita GDP path of the
Synthetic Tunisia, leading to a biased estimate. For that reason, we exclude from our sample: (i)
countries that were impacted, directly or indirectly, by the Arab Spring; (ii) countries that were hit
by an unexpected exogenous shock (such as natural disasters, conflicts, or adverse economic
spillovers from neighboring countries) after 2010; and (iii) countries that had to be bailed out to
avoid a complete collapse of their economies such as Cyprus and Greece. For a list of the 32 omitted
countries and a brief explanation on why we excluded them, we refer the reader to table A.1.13 In
addition, 36 countries were excluded from our sample of controls as a result of missing data in some
of the covariates we use in the analysis (more details about the choice of covariates are presented in
the paragraph below). Consequently, our final set of controls consists of 114 countries listed in table
S.2 of the supplemental appendix.14
As previously discussed, and in addition to having approximately the same GDP per capita, the
constructed Synthetic Tunisia should also have similar economic fundamentals to Tunisia prior to
the Arab Spring (equation 2). In this case, we require Tunisia and its synthetic counterpart to have
approximately the same structure in terms of the composition of expenditure 15 (consumption,
investment [denoted as GCF], imports and exports) and value added 16 (value added of the
agriculture, industry, and services sectors), all as a share of GDP, in the pre-treatment period. We
also require Tunisia and its synthetic counterpart to have a similar level of life expectancy at birth
and secondary school enrollment rate, which are both components of the widely used Human
Development Index.17 Data for all the covariates were downloaded from the World Bank WDI
database. For each covariate, except for the human development indicators (life expectancy at birth
and secondary school enrollment)18 we use two values: the 1990-2000 average and the 2001-2010
average. The rationale behind this division is to ensure that the constructed Synthetic Tunisia does
not only have the same average economic fundamentals as Tunisia during the whole pre-AS period
but also a similar dynamic structure over time. If, on the other hand, we use the 1990-2010 averages
we could end up choosing countries that had a different economic evolution compared to Tunisia,
hence leading to biased estimates. Finally, and in order to maximize the goodness of fit of the
Synthetic Tunisia with the actual Tunisia during the pre-AS period, we add to our set of covariates
the average GDP per capita during the following periods: 1990–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004 and
2005–2010.19 Table S.1 in the supplemental appendix provides a definition and the source of each
13. All tables are available in the appendix.
14. The supplemental appendix can be found in the published version of this paper.
15. According to the expenditure approach:ܩܦܲ = ܥ݋݊ ݏݑ݉݌݅ݐ݋݊ + ݊ܫ ݁ݒ ݏ݉ݐ ݁݊ ݐ+ ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐݏ− ݉ܫ ݌݋ݎݐ. Note
that consumption accounts for both private and government components.
16. According to the value added (output) approach: ܩܦܲ = ܸ݈ܽ ݑ ݁ܽ݀݀݁݀ (ܣ݃݅ݎ ݈ܿݑ ݐݑ݁ݎ + ݊ܫ ݀ݑݏݐݎݕ+
ܵ݁ ݎ݅ݒ ܿ݁ ݏ).
17. We also experimented with additional variables that capture institutional factors (ICRG and the Polity2
Indices) to test the robustness of our results, but their addition did not alter our result substantively, as illustrated in
figure S.1.
18. The within variation of the life expectancy variable during the pre-revolution period (1990-2010) is only two
years, meaning that this variable did not witness a significant variation across time. Hence, taking the average would
be sufficient. Regarding the secondary school enrollment variable, we attempted to divide our sample into two
subsamples (1990-2000 and 2001-2010). However, we noticed that, for many countries, data for this variable was
missing during the first subsample, and, as a result, many countries would have been dropped from the analysis leading
to a significant loss of data. For that reason, we considered the average over the whole pre-revolution period (1990-
2010). This rationale also applies to all the other covariates.
19. The use of period averages as covariates is a common technique followed by most researchers that employed
the Synthetic Control Methodology (Abadie and Gardeazabal [2003]; Abadie et al. [2010]; Campos et. al [2014];
Abadie et al. [2015] and Gobillon and Magnac [2015]; among others). Moreover, in a recent paper, Klaus et al. (2016)
showed theoretically and empirically that, when using the SCM, we cannot use all the lagged variables of the outcome
8variable used, while table S.2 displays the variables’ average corresponding to each country in the
set of 114 donor controls.
IV. ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE ARAB SPRING
Empirical Results
Table A.2 shows that Synthetic Tunisia is best reconstructed as a weighted average of 14 countries
with Poland, Republic of Congo, Sri Lanka, India, Mauritius, and Belize having the highest weights.
Figure 1 illustrates the GDP per capita of Tunisia and these six other countries over time.20 Table
A.3 displays the average pre-2011 values of the variables of interest for Tunisia, Synthetic Tunisia,
and the simple average of the 114 countries in the set of control countries. Synthetic Tunisia
approximates the pre-2011 values of the GDP per capita covariates for Tunisia much more closely
than the average of the 114 countries. Indeed, Synthetic Tunisia is very similar to actual Tunisia in
terms of pre-2011 per capita GDP, the respective shares of investment (GCF), consumption,
imports, exports, agriculture, service in total GDP, and life expectancy at birth as well as the
secondary school enrollment rate. In general, table A.3 suggests that Synthetic Tunisia, constructed
using the SCM, has almost the same economic and social structure as the actual Tunisia during the
pre-2011 period.
Figure 1. GDP per capita: Tunisia and
countries with highest six weights in Synthetic
Tunisia.
Figure 2. GDP per capita: Tunisia vs Synthetic
Tunisia.
Source: World Development Indicators. Source: Authors’ Calculations.
Figure 2 depicts the paths of per capita GDP of actual and Synthetic Tunisia, which are very similar
up to 2010 but diverge markedly thereafter. In particular, each Tunisian citizen is estimated to have
lost, on average, US$ 600 (5.5 percent of GDP per capita), US$ 574 (5.1 percent of GDP per capita)
variable (in our case per capita GDP) as this will render the other covariates irrelevant, leading to severe biases in the
estimated impact of the treatment.
20. From figure 1 we observe that Sri Lanka’s per capita GDP was increasing rapidly after 2009. This improvement
in economic activity was mainly driven by the reconstruction efforts and increased consumption following the 26 year
war that ended in 2009. While this fast growth, which averaged 6.4 percent between 2009 and 2013, may bias upward
our results as it was not purely driven by structural economic activity, our results are not affected by excluding Sri
Lanka from our sample (see the robustness analysis in section V below).
9and US$ 735 (6.4 percent of GDP per capita) by 2011, 2012, and 2013, respectively.21 In section 0,
we apply standard placebo tests to these results and in section 6 we perform a variety of other
robustness tests and discuss some of the limitations of the SCM.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that these estimates also reflect some mitigating
measures taken by the local authorities and the international community in order to boost economic
activity in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. For instance, the Central Bank of Tunisia (CBT)
adopted an expansionary monetary policy by: (i) lowering its key interest rate by 100 basis points
(bps) between May and September 2011; (ii) reducing the reserve requirement ratio of commercial
banks from 12 to two percent; and (iii) gave, in 2011, TD 3.6 billion (US$ 2.6 billion) to commercial
banks in order to boost liquidity. At the same time, the government pursued an expansionary fiscal
policy in the aftermath of the revolution (more details in section 0). In addition, the international
community stepped up its assistance to Tunisia, including a US$ 500 million loan approved by The
World Bank board in June 2011 and a US$ 1.74 billion Stand-by-Agreement signed with the IMF
two years later.
Testing the Validity of the Results
Unfortunately, we cannot refer to standard p-values to make statistical inferences about our
estimates given that we are not using a regression estimation technique, and our sample size is
relatively small. Instead, we use “Placebo or Falsification Tests,” which are also known in the
statistical literature by the name of “Randomization Inference Tests” (Bertrand et al. [2004]). In a
general context, the rationale behind these tests is simple: when SCM is applied to units (countries)
that were not subject to the treatment (Arab Spring), we should not observe a significant divergence
between the post-2010 outcomes for Tunisia and its synthetic counterpart. In essence, we want to
examine whether repeating the synthetic control analysis for countries that, in 2011, were not
subject to the Arab Spring would show the same negative shock to output as Tunisia. If this is the
case, then the observed drop in Tunisia’s per capita GDP cannot be attributed to the Arab Spring.
Figure 3 presents the results of the Placebo tests applied to the 114 countries in 2011. While
the thick, black dotted line represents the previously estimated difference for Tunisia, the other
different-colored lines are the difference between the GDP per capita corresponding to each of the
114 control countries and their respective synthetic counterparts constructed between 1990 and
2010. We can see from Figure 3 that the post-2010 lines for countries other than Tunisia are quite
widely spread, suggesting at first glance that the negative impact generated by the Tunisian
revolution was not unusually large. However, for many countries, the fit of the synthetic to the
actual before 2010 is much worse than in the case of Tunisia. Consequently, we look at a normalized
ratio, where we divide, for each placebo that exhibited a negative difference after 2010, the root
mean square post-2010 difference by the root mean square pre-2010 difference for the same
country.22 The higher is this normalized ratio the larger is the negative impact of a shock after 2010
relative to the pre-2010 average. Table A.4 shows that Tunisia had an estimated normalized ratio
21. We do not think our results suffer from an endogeneity problem as: (i) the uprisings were unanticipated ex-
ante (Gelvin, 2015); and (ii) the economic performance in Tunisia was relatively good prior to the revolutions. Indeed,
“Tunisia enjoyed a 4.4 percent average annual growth in GDP over 2000-2010, placing the country among the leading
performers in the MENA region. This level of growth was accompanied by rapid poverty reduction from 32 percent in
2000 to 16 percent in 2010 using the national poverty line. Similarly, the percentage of the population below the
international US$2 per day (PPP) poverty line dropped from 12.8 percent in 2000 to 4.3 percent in 2010.” (World Bank,
2014, p. 24). However, we should note that despite the overall improved economy, growth was not totally inclusive
as Rijkers et al. (2014) found that firms connected to Ben Ali and his family outperformed their competitors (higher
employment, output, and profits) mainly due to preferential regulatory treatments.
22 The difference for country ݅ during ݏ= 1, … ,ܶ is the Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE) calculated
as ටଵ
்
∑ (ݕ௦௜− ݕ௦௦௬௡௧௛)ଶ்௦ୀ௧ .
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of 8.46 which is the second highest among all the 115 countries and is only surpassed by Antigua
and Barbuda which recorded a ratio of 8.52. According to the IMF (2012), Antigua and Barbuda’s
economy contracted by 5.5 percent in 2011 as a result of the 2007-08 financial crisis. Hence, our
original results are unlikely to have been driven by factors other than the Jasmine revolution.
In addition, we use another simple, yet novel, method to test the significance of our results. In
particular, we calculate
ݕ௧ = ܣ ܿݐݑ݈ܽ ܩܦܲ ݌݁ ݎܥ ݌ܽ݅ ܽݐ ௧ܵ݊ݕ ݐℎ ݁݅ݐܿܩܦܲ ݌݁ ݎܥ ݌ܽ݅ ܽݐ ௧ ݋݂ݎݐ= 1990, … ,2013 (5)
for Tunisia and each of the 114 control countries and then regress this variable on a constant and a
dummy variable called AS௧ that takes the value 1 for 2011, 2012, and 2013 and 0 otherwise. In each
of the 115 individual regressions, we are interested in the magnitude and sign of the t-statistic
corresponding to the AS௧ dummy. The statistical significance of this dummy variable is a test of
whether a country was subject to a significant shock to its GDP relative to its synthetic counterpart
in the period 2011-2013. In particular, largely negative t-statistics suggest that events that occurred
between 2011 and 2013 had significantly negative impacts on the respective economies. The results
reported in table A.5 show that, with the exception of Spain, the Tunisian version of regression (5)
yielded the largest negative t-statistic on the AS௧ dummy (-8.7), confirming the salience of our
results.
Figure 3. Placebo Tests. Figure 4. GDP per capita: Tunisia vs Synthetic
Tunisia.
Source: Source: Authors’ Calculations. Source: Authors’ Calculations.
V. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
To assess the effectiveness of our results and to make sure that the GDP per capita of the
constructed Synthetic Tunisia is not driven by only one country, we perform a robustness check
according to the following procedure. First, we restrict our sample to all the control countries that
were assigned a non-zero weight in the baseline Synthetic Tunisia.23 Second, we construct several
Synthetic Tunisias by omitting these countries one at a time while keeping the others in our set of
23. The control countries with non-zero weights are presented in table A.2.
11
controls. As noted by Abadie et al. (2015), the intuition is to check if the results are sensitive to the
omission of any particular country. Figure 4 illustrates this sensitivity analysis and shows that
excluding any of these control countries does not alter the path of the baseline Synthetic Tunisia
after 2010, meaning that our results are fairly robust as they are not driven by one particular
country.
Another falsification (or fake) test that can be used to determine the reliability of our results is
“time series placebos.” In this test, we replicate the synthetic control analysis for years earlier than
2011 in which the Tunisian economy did not actually experience any structural break (or shock)
and ask the following question: do we observe a significant drop in the actual Tunisian per capita
GDP compared to its synthetic counterpart after this fictitious treatment? If the answer to this
question is yes, this means that our estimated results found earlier (illustrated in Figure 2 may have
been driven by factors other than the Arab Spring itself. In contrast, a “no” answer supports our
conclusion that the Arab Spring caused the observed economic slowdown during the period 2011–
2013. Specifically, we replicate the same SCM procedure followed above by constructing Synthetic
Tunisia using, instead of 1990 to 2010, the period 1990 to 2000 as a pre-shock period. In fact, we
chose 2000 to be the end point given that Tunisia was not subject to any structural shock in the
early 2000s. As illustrated in figure S.2 in the supplemental appendix, we find that Tunisia’s per
capita GDP did not drop relative to its synthetic counterpart in the aftermath of 2000.
However, given the high dependence of Tunisia’s economy on economic activity in the Euro
area,24 one might argue that the sluggish economic activity in Tunisia after 2011 was driven by
weaker demand from the Euro-area. In order to test for that, we replicate the SCM analysis for
2008, the year when the Euro area witnessed a sharp deceleration in its economic activity as a result
of the 2007–08 financial crisis. We notice from figure S.3 in the supplemental appendix that
Tunisian GDP per capita was almost unchanged relative to its synthetic counterpart (Synthetic
Tunisia 2008) in the aftermath of the financial crisis that brought havoc to economies in the Euro
area. This confirms our main finding that the observed drop in per capita GDP after 2011 was
primarily caused by the Arab Spring rather than the deceleration in the Euro economy.
In addition, we conduct two additional tests. First, we remove the Republic of Congo, Poland,
and Sri-Lanka from our pool of potential controls as these countries experienced major shocks in
the run-up to the Arab Spring, possibly affecting the structure of the Synthetic Tunisia. In
particular, Poland accessed the EU in 2004 while the Republic of Congo and Sri-Lanka were both
ravaged by armed conflicts during the last two decades. Second, using five-year averages for GDP
per capita may mask different underlying trends between the control countries and Tunisia. To
address this we shorten our time span for the real GDP per capita covariate and consider three-year
period averages instead of five. Figure S.4 in the supplemental appendix plots the GDP per capita
for: (i) actual Tunisia (dotted blue line); (ii) baseline Synthetic Tunisia (straight red line); (iii)
Synthetic Tunisia after omitting the three countries (straight black line); and (iv) Synthetic Tunisia
after taking a three-year period (dashed green line).25 The results illustrate that, in the first test, the
GDP per capita of the Synthetic Tunisia follows closely its baseline counterpart even though its
level is slightly lower since 2009 (i.e., prior to the Arab Spring) likely reflecting the fact that Tunisia
was not severely hit by the 2007–08 financial crisis in contrast to the other control countries.
Meanwhile, the black line representing the Synthetic Tunisia of the second test, has approximately
24. For example, the correlation between the growth rate of Tunisian exports and economic growth in the Euro
area was 0.64 between 1998 and 2012.
25. The covariate averages of the Synthetic Tunisias developed using test 1 and 2 are reported along with the
weights assigned to each control country composing the respective counterfactual in table S.3 and table S.4 of the
supplemental appendix, respectively. Note that, with the first test, Angola and Malaysia have replaced the Republic of
Congo, Poland, and Sri Lanka as control countries. However, India, Mauritius, and Belize, which formed the core of the
baseline Synthetic Tunisia, were assigned even higher weights, meaning that the composition of the baseline synthetic
was not particularly changed.
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the same level before and after 2011, implying that our baseline results were not affected by different
trends.
Another robustness check is to use a different methodology in order to quantify the impact of
the Arab Spring (AS) on Tunisian GDP per capita. In particular, we estimate the following
Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL [1]).
Δlog(Tunisia୲) = ܿ+ ߚଵ.Δlog(World୲) + ߚଶ.Δlog(Tunisia୲ି ଵ)+ߚଷ.Δlog(World୲ି ଵ) + ࢽᇱ[࡭ࡿ] + ߤ௧ (6)
where Δlog(Tunisia୲) is the log difference of Tunisia’s GDP per capita and [࡭ࡿ] is a (3×1) vector of
individual time dummies for 2011, 2012, and 2013 that take the value 1 for the corresponding year
and 0 otherwise. To capture the impact of changes in the global economy on the Tunisian economy,
we added to our model Δlog(World୲), which denotes the log difference of the World’s GDP per capita.
Since the difference of Tunisia’s GDP per capita is a generated variable, we bootstrap our standard
errors with 1000 replications.26 The per capita GDP data for both Tunisia and the World, which
run from 1990 to 2013,27 were downloaded from the WDI database. In equation (6) the coefficients
of interest are those in vector ࢽwhich capture the impact of the Arab Spring on Tunisia’s per capita
GDP growth in each year following the uprisings. The estimation results presented in table A.6,
show that, of the year dummies, those of 2011 and 2013 are negative and statistically significant at
the five percent level. In terms of magnitude, growth of GDP per capita (in PPP terms) dropped by
5.8 and 1.8 percentage points in 2011 and 2013, respectively. This compares to a 5.2 and 1.4
percentage point drop in 2011 and 2013 when using the Synthetic Control Method.28 Overall, the
SCM and regression results corroborate each other, because they suggest that the major impact of
the Arab Spring on the Tunisian economy happened in 2011, but this impact is carried forward in
2012 and even amplified in 2013 as the Tunisian economy did not catch up with its synthetic
counterpart (as evident by the SCM results).
Finally, there is the issue of the high level of oil prices after 2010 relative to previously. Oil price
fluctuations have opposite effects on net exporters and net importers of oil. Although Tunisia’s net
oil exports are small, the same might not be true of Synthetic Tunisia, because we have not used
this as a criterion for choosing the weights. Indeed, Synthetic Tunisia is a weighted average of some
countries that have considerable oil imports and two (Republic of Congo and Trinidad and Tobago)
that are major oil exporters as can be seen from the data presented in table S.6 of the supplemental
appendix, but, in fact, the weighted average is not too different from that of actual Tunisia.29 For
example, net fuel exports for Tunisia in 2010 were -1.1 percent of GDP compared to 1.6 percent for
its synthetic counterpart.30 Therefore, there was a 2.7 percentage point (pp) difference even before
26. We should note that only 278 replications were successful. This is likely due to the fact that we had three one-
year dummies. In particular, it is highly likely that, at any random draw, at least two of the three individual dummies
will only be composed of 0 observation, hence leading to perfect multicollinearity. For additional testing we also
employed the jackknife resampling technique. As reported in table S.5 in the supplemental appendix, the results
magnitudes and statistical significance of the estimated coefficients remained unchanged.
27. GDP per capita (in PPP terms) for Tunisia and the World is only available since 1990.
28. The 5.2 percentage point estimate for 2011 is calculated as the difference between the GDP per capita growth
rate of actual Tunisia in 2011 (-1.7 percent) and that of its synthetic counterpart calculated (3.5 percent) estimated using
the SCM method. For 2013, the GDP per capita growth rate of actual Tunisia was 1.4 percent compared to 2.9 for its
synthetic counterpart.
29. As can be seen from table S.6, net fuel exports data are not available for each country and year. For instance, it
is missing for 14 out of 21 years for the Republic of Congo. In a general context, the SCM algorithm overcomes this
data problem by taking the average of any non-missing values during the pre-intervention period. In our specific
example, the corresponding average for net fuel exports between the period 1990-2000 will be the average values
between 1993 and 1995, which equals 46.46 percent. While this is not perfect, it allows us to avoid losing valuable data
and maximize our sample size (Billmeier and Nannicini, 2013).
30. The 1.6 percent representing net fuel exports (as a ratio of GDP) of Synthetic Tunisia in 2010 was calculated
as follows. We multiplied the net fuel exports data for each of the 14 countries reported in table S.6 of the supplemental
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the uprisings occurred. Repeating this same exercise for the years following the Arab Spring, we
observe that this difference initially increased to 4.7 pp in 2011 and then dropped back to 3.8 and
3.3 pp.
It is a useful robustness test to add net fuel exports as a share of GDP to our initial set of
covariates.31 Because of the importance of the mining sector in the Tunisian economy (which
accounted for 9.2 percent of total exported goods in 2010), we also add ores and metal exports (as
a ratio of GDP) as a covariate.32 Table A.7 reports the covariate averages of actual Tunisia and its
synthetic counterpart after adding these two variables along with the corresponding weights
assigned to each control country.33 We notice that the set of control countries composing the new
Synthetic Tunisia has changed slightly relative to the baseline. One major reason for that is data
limitation as eleven countries, including Uzbekistan, which had a 3.5 percent weight in the baseline
synthetic, had to be omitted from the initial set of 114 controls because of the lack of data on net
fuel exports. This change also reflects the fact that it was suboptimal to closely match the two
additional covariates using the initial set of 14 countries.
However, none of the newly added countries (Guinea-Bissau, Grenada, Malaysia, and
Zimbabwe) receive a weight greater than 1.5 percent. Furthermore, countries which were originally
assigned a weight greater than ten percent in the baseline specification (India, Sri Lanka, Mauritius,
and Belize) still account for a total of 60.8 percent of the newly constructed Synthetic Tunisia. These
two observations suggest that the core structure of the baseline synthetic Tunisia was not
significantly altered by the inclusion of additional variables. Consequently, we do not expect a major
change to our baseline findings regarding the impact of the Arab Spring on the Tunisian economy.
Indeed, Figure 5 below shows that, even after adding these two variables, the path of Synthetic
Tunisia’s GDP per capita (gray dashed line) is roughly the same compared to the baseline (black
straight line), suggesting that our baseline results are robust to changing our set of covariates.
It is important to recognize the limitations of the SCM approach. Ideally, we need a longer pre-
Arab Spring period than we actually have in order to reduce any possible omitted variable bias.
Unfortunately, we could not do this because the earliest observation for our outcome variable (GDP
per capita in PPP terms) is 1990. More fundamentally, the SCM depends on the right criteria being
used to match the synthetic with the actual. Features of a country that are not easily quantifiable
such as trade and labor market regulations, tax systems, and the relationship between business and
the state, cannot easily be included. It also depends on the weighted average being an adequate
measure of similarity, which it will not be if the effects of a variable (oil prices, say) are asymmetric
between oil importers and oil exporters. Non-linearities may also be a problem since the fuel trade
balance of major oil exporters is much further from zero than that of any oil importer. Finally, the
SCM does not control for idiosyncratic shocks that may have impacted Tunisia or any control
country differently after 2011. These limitations mean that it is important to test the robustness of
SCM results thoroughly.
appendix (except for Uzbekistan and Trinidad and Tobago, which did not have completed net fuel exports data between
2010 and 2013) by their respective weights from table A.2 and then summed them up.
31. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
32. The definition and source of the net fuel exports and exports of ores and metals can be found in table S.1 of the
supplemental appendix.
33. We denote net fuel exports (as percent of GDP) and ores and metal exports (as a percent of GDP) by nfx and
omx, respectively.
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Figure 5. GDP per capita: Tunisia vs Synthetic Tunisia.
Source: Authors’ calculations. Synthetic Tunisia (with nfx and
omx) represents the baseline synthetic Tunisia after adding to
the baseline the following variables (i) net fuel exports (% of
GDP) and (ii) ores and metal exports (% of GDP).
VI. THE MAIN CHANNEL OF THE IMPACT
Given the substantial negative impact of the Arab Spring on Tunisia, the question arises as to what
was the main channel through which the impact occurred?
Stylized Facts in the Wake of the Revolution
To better understand the channels through which the Arab Spring affected the Tunisian economy,
we refer to the annual growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) series from 2000 to 2013
published by the Tunisian National Institute of Statistics (TNIS). As illustrated in table A.8,
investment was the main drag on economic activity after 2011 and its growth rate was largely
impacted by the intensity of security and political developments between 2011 and 2013. More
specifically, it dropped by 12.7 percent in 2011 when the Tunisian revolution erupted, grew by 6.1
percent in 2012 with the relatively improved security conditions, and then decelerated with only
0.2 percent growth in 2013 as the political crisis between the secular opposition and the Islamic
brotherhood intensified. In addition to the observed drop in the level of investment, Burger et al.
(2013) argued that the composition of foreign investment has changed as a result the increased
political turmoil. In particular, they found evidence of lower investment inflows in the non-resource
tradable sectors in contrast to investments in resource-rich sectors, which were found to be
insensitive to political turmoil.
Furthermore, the revolution had an adverse effect on real exports through lower mining output
and tourism inflows as illustrated in table A.9. The mining sector, which accounted for 9.2 percent
of total exported goods in 2010 (pre-revolution), was hit severely in the aftermath of the revolution
as protests by poor citizens demanding jobs and higher living standards paralyzed the phosphate
industry in the city of Gafsa. Data published by the TNIS show that, in 2011, the value of mining
exports plummeted by 39.7 percent due to a 56.6 percent drop in phosphate (DAP) exports.
However, during 2011 the international price of DAP increased by 23.6 percent (from 500.6
US$/mt in 2010 to 618.8 US$/mt in 2011), meaning that the drop in DAP exports was driven by
a reduction in the quantity supplied as a consequence of the uprisings. Indeed, “According to the
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Compagnie des phosphates de Gafsa (CPG), phosphate production was only 2.5 million tons in 2011,
compared to 8 million in 2010. The amount of phosphate produced fell to under 3 million” (African
Development Bank 2012, 5). This has largely contributed34 to the 4.3 percent contraction of total
real exports in 2011. On the other hand, consumption growth did not witness a significant changing
pattern after 2011.
Empirical Results
In order to determine which channel drove Tunisia’s output to decline as a result of the Arab Spring,
we employ the SCM methodology used above for each GDP component: Gross Capital Formation
(CGF or Investment), Consumption, and Net Exports, all measured as a percentage of GDP.
We first start by constructing a counterfactual for CGF between 1996 and 2010.35 Our set of
covariates includes Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Broad Money as a ratio of GDP with the
latter being a proxy for monetary policy that impacts investment. In addition, the long and
protracted period of transition from an autocratic to a democratic regime created uncertainty about
the future political and economic agendas (Pfeifer, 2015) and, as a result, investors’ risk appetite
may have been impacted. To account for this increase in uncertainty, which is argued to negatively
impact investment,36 we incorporate into our set of characteristics the Rule of Law Estimate37 taken
from the Worldwide Governance Indicators database (WGI) published by the World Bank. 38
Regarding consumption, our set of covariates is composed of: (i) remittances, which is found by
Chami et al. (2008) to increase the consumption of domestic households; (ii) tax revenues which can
be used as a proxy for domestic consumption; and (iii) government expenses for providing goods
and services which controls for current government spending. Finally, and in order to create the
synthetic counterpart of the Tunisian trade balance, we use the real effective exchange rate in
addition to ores and metal exports and net fuel exports as covariates.
As illustrated in Figure 6a, consumption (as a ratio of GDP) for Tunisia surged above the value
for its synthetic counterpart after 2011.39 This increase was driven by a dramatic rise in government
spending as a result of the fiscal expansion program adopted by the government in the aftermath of
the uprisings that aimed at mitigating the impact of the revolution on its citizens and addressing
their demands.40 The wage bill increased as a share of GDP from 10.7 percent in 2010 to 12.4
percent in 2013. This increase was coupled with a significant rise in transfers and subsidies after the
revolution.41
34. ܥ݋݊ ݐ݅ݎ ܾݑ݅ݐ݋݊ ݐ݋ݐ݋ܽݐ ݈݁ݔ݌݋ݎݐݏ(ݐ) = [݃ݎ݋ݓݐℎܽݎ ݁ݐ (ݐ) × ℎܵ ܽ݁ݎ ݋݂ ݐ݋ܽݐ ݈ܧݔ݌݋ݎݐݏ(ݐ− 1)]/100.
35. The starting period is 1996 and not 1990 because the rule of law estimate that we use as one of the characteristics
to investment is only available since 1996.
36. Several scholars (Bernanke [1983], Barro [1991], Alessina and Perotti [1996], Pindyck and Solimano [1993],
Bloom et al. [2007], and Julio and Yook [2012]; among many others) have argued that investment is negatively
associated with uncertainty as it induces firms to postpone investment decisions in “anticipation of possible negative
changes in the country’s macroeconomic, taxation, or monetary policies, or in the regulatory environment in general”
(Julio and Yook 2012: 49).
37. Table S.1 in the supplemental appendix provides a definition and the source of each variable used.
38. As a robustness test, we replaced the Rule of Law Index by the Government Stability component of the ICRG
index as a measure of political instability. The results, presented in figure S.5 of the supplemental appendix, confirm the
robustness of our finding.
39 . For each variable in Figure 6 the dashed and straight lines represent Tunisia and Synthetic Tunisia,
respectively.
40. According to a (2012) IMF report, the government recruited, on a net basis, 20 thousand new employees, which
increased the total wage bill of the government by 14 percent in 2011. Furthermore, a 4.7 percent increase on civil
servants’ wages was implemented in 2011 while security forces were provided with additional benefits.
41. Many governments in the Middle East and North Africa region (Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait,
Morocco, Oman, and Tunisia) responded to the social demands in the onset of the Arab Spring by increasing fuel and
food subsidies (World Bank, 2011, p. 14)(World Bank 2011: 14).
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On the other hand, when looking at investment (GCF) in Figure 6b, we observe an opposite
pattern with Tunisia’s actual investment (as a percentage of GDP) plummeting compared to its
constructed counterfactual since 2011, implying that investment in Tunisia was adversely impacted
by the Arab Spring. In parallel, Figure 6c indicates that the actual trade balance deteriorated faster
compared to its counterfactual without the Arab Spring. More specifically, Tunisia’s investment
(net exports) as a ratio of GDP was lower than that of its synthetic counterpart by an estimated 3.9
(2.6) percentage points on average between 2011 and 2013. As can be seen in table S.7 and table S.8
of the supplemental appendix, Tunisia had the second and first highest post-to-pre Arab Spring
normalized ratio for investment and net exports, respectively, suggesting that the declines in these
variables are unlikely to have been driven by issues other than the Arab Spring itself.
Overall, the results suggest that investment was the major channel through which the Arab
Spring impacted the Tunisian economy, most likely due to the increased uncertainty associated with
it. In particular, uncertainty may have induced firms to postpone investment decisions and
reinforced investors’ wait-and-see attitude. There was an unprecedented increase in the number of
protests and riots in the country.42 This led to fears of even greater conflict such as that which
engulfed neighbouring Libya. Moreover, even if a worsening conflict could be avoided, there were
policy uncertainties associated with the political deadlock between secularist and Islamic political
leaders, some of whom wished to follow an Islamic economic model similar to the one attempted by
the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As a result, there was a succession of five governments between
2011 and 2013 and the drafting of a new constitution. Of course, we cannot conclusively establish
that uncertainty was the most important factor that drove down investment. Another possibility is
that the large drop in investment stemmed from a credit channel similar to the one that inhibited
OECD countries after the 2008 global financial crisis. However, as noted at the end of section 0
above, the Tunisian Central Bank adopted an expansionary monetary policy aimed at boosting
economic growth. Moreover, the Tunisian banking system is dominated by three large state-owned
banks that were bailed out and encouraged to keep lending. Finally, Tunisian firms surveyed in the
World Bank Enterprise Survey of 2013 cited political instability ahead of access to finance as the
main constraint on their growth, a verdict supported by microeconometric analysis of data on firm
sales growth from the survey (Matta 2016).
42. According to data collected from the ACLED database, the number of protests/riots that took place in Tunisia
between 2011 and 2014 rose by more than eighteenfold compared to the period 1997-2010.
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Figure 6. Components of GDP: Tunisia vs Synthetic Tunisia.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the worldwide interest in the Arab Spring in general and the Tunisia revolution
in particular, there are no studies that have quantified the impact of this largely unanticipated event
on the Tunisian economy. This paper fills this research gap by quantifying the effect of the Arab
Spring on the Tunisian macroeconomy from 2011 to 2013. To overcome the data limitation
problems and to allow for time-changing unobservable variables, we use the Synthetic Control
Method, constructing a Synthetic Tunisia (a weighted average of other countries selected to have a
strong resemblance to Tunisia over the period 1990-2010) as an estimate of Tunisia in the absence
of the Arab Spring.
Our results suggest that the Arab Spring had a negative effect on the aggregate economy with
an estimated per capita reduction in output of US$ 600 (5.5 percent of GDP per capita) in 2011,
US$ 574 (5.1 percent of GDP per capita) in 2012 and US$ 735 (6.4 percent of GDP per capita) in
2013. The estimates, which are robust to placebo tests and further sensitivity analysis, suggest that
most of the impact occurred in the first year with limited further losses (but also no recovery) over
the next two years. Our results are consistent with the literature on the growth dividends associated
with regime changes, which finds a drop in growth rates during the early years of a political
transition (see Freund and Jaud [2014]). We also find that investment was the main channel
through which the economy was impacted.
Nevertheless, it is important also to recognize the limitations of the methodology, the most
important of which is the assumption that the weighted average of any variable is a sufficient
statistic to guarantee the similarity of Synthetic and actual Tunisia in any period. Because the
countries that make up Synthetic Tunisia are a mixture of ones with higher and ones with lower
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values of any variable than actual Tunisia, this may be an invalid assumption if the effects of these
differences are non-linear or asymmetric as we have discussed above in relation to oil prices.
This paper draws a broad picture of the impact of the Arab Spring on Tunisia’s economy.
However, it does not quantify the possible political and social benefits Tunisians might have gained
from moving from an autocratic to a democratic regime.43 Moreover, the post-shock period is too
short to assess the long-run impact of Arab Spring on the Tunisian economy. Whether, and at what
pace, the Tunisian economy might catch up with its synthetic counterpart in the longrun will
depend in part on the state’s ability to protect the interests of investors and tourists. Recent
hostilities by the Islamic State (IS) and the havoc it is bringing to many Arab countries, especially
Libya, one of the main trading partners with Tunisia, might worsen the already weakened economy.
The analysis undertaken in this paper suggests several avenues for further empirical research.
In particular, it would be valuable to examine the implications of the Arab Spring from a micro
perspective. For example, research is needed to understand how micro agents (firms and
households) were affected by the uprisings and whether the impact was heterogeneous across
different groups. It would also be interesting to examine what impact the Arab Spring had on
headcount poverty, inequality, and female and youth incomes. This line of research could help
policymakers develop better tools to alleviate the impact of revolutions.
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APPENDIX
TABLE A1. List of Omitted Countries
Country Exogenous Schock After 2010
Algeria Indirectly impacted by the Arab Spring since 2011
Bahamas /1 Impacted by several storms in 2012 and 2013
Bahrain Directly impacted by the Arab Spring since 2011
Barbados Impacted by tropical storm Chantal in 2013
Central African Republic /2 Impacted by a coup d’état in 2013
China /3 Hit by several earthquakes between 2011 and 2015
Cuba Relations between the US and Cuba have been restored after 54 years of anomisity
Cyprus Agreed a 10 billion Euro bailout package to avoid bankruptcy in 2013
Dominica /4 Hit by hurricane Ophelia in 2011
Egypt, Arab Republic Directly impacted by the Arab Spring since 2011
Gambia/5 The agriculture sector was severely impacted as a result of the severe drought in 2011
Greece Agreed two bailout packages in 2012 and 2015 worth 130 and 86 billion Euros, respectively to avoid bankruptcy
Honduras Honduras was affected by the tropical storm Ernesto in 2012
Iraq Subject to multiple security shocks
Islamic Republic of Iran Impacted by the sanctions imposed since 2012 on the energy and financial sectors
Japan /6 Hit by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster in 2011
Jordan Indirectly impacted by the Arab Spring since 2011
Lebanon Indirectly impacted by the Arab Spring since 2011
Mali/7 Impacted by a coup d’état in 2012
Morocco Indirectly impacted by the Arab Spring since 2011
Nepal /8 Hit by two severe earthquakes in 2015
Philippines /9 Hit by Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in 2013
Russian Federation /10 Negatively impacted by economic sanctions in 2014
St. Lucia /11 Hit by a severe storm in December 2013
St. Vincent and the Grenadines /12 Hit by a severe storm in April 2011
Sudan In 2011 Sudan was divided into two states: Sudan and South Sudan
St. Kitts and Nevis /13 Hit by intense floods
Swaziland /14 Experienced a severe fiscal crisis
Thailand /15 Hit by unprecedented floods in 2011
Ukraine /16 Impacted by the internal conflict that started in November 2013 and then evolved into an internal war in 2014
Yemen Republic Directly impacted by the Arab Spring since 2011









































Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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GCF average 1990-2000 26.0 25.9 21.5
GCF average 2001-2010 24.3 24.4 22.6
Consumption average 1990-2000 78.1 78.2 83.4
Consumption average 2001-2010 78.5 78.5 81.3
Imports average 1990-2000 45.1 45.1 41.7
Imports average 2001-2010 48.8 48.8 46.3
Exports average 1990-2000 41.0 41.0 36.7
Exports average 2001-2010 45.9 45.9 42.3
Agriculture 1990-2000 14.9 16.3 18.9
Agriculture 2001-2010 9.7 11.1 14.7
Services 1990-2000 53.3 53.9 51.3
Services 2001-2010 60.2 57.7 55.0
Life Expectancy at birth (years) 72.5 68.0 66.1
Secondary School Enrollment (%) 70.6 71.7 67.2
GDP per capita average 1990-1994 (US$) 5,810 5,801 12,068
GDP per capita average 1995-1999 (US$) 6,636 6,627 13,093
GDP per capita average 2000-2004 (US$) 7,895 7,877 14,585
GDP per capita average 2005-2010 (US$) 9,656 9,634 16,742
Source: Authors’ own calculations. *All variables are in percentage of GDP (%) unless stated
otherwise.
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Georgia 0.14 Grenada 1.71
Saudi Arabia 0.14 Fiji 1.76
Angola 0.15 Comoros 1.81
Dominican Republic 0.17 United Kingdom 1.84
Botswana 0.22 Togo 1.85
Ethiopia 0.25 Puerto Rico 1.88
Chile 0.27 Macedonia, FYR 1.89
Australia 0.36 Denmark 1.93
Moldova 0.36 Uganda 1.95
Korea, Rep. 0.51 Zambia 1.95
Sweden 0.53 Mauritania 2.36
Armenia 0.56 Guyana 2.36
Guinea-Bissau 0.56 Turkey 2.37
Poland 0.57 Tanzania 2.66
Tajikistan 0.57 Niger 2.67
United States 0.67 Burundi 2.78
Mozambique 0.67 Cameroon 2.91
Belize 0.69 Senegal 3.07
Tonga 0.72 Cote d'Ivoire 3.10
Costa Rica 0.77 Pakistan 3.59
Djibouti 0.87 Benin 3.76
New Zealand 0.88 Madagascar 3.76
Congo, Rep. 1.02 El Salvador 3.76
Chad 1.08 Paraguay 3.77
Nigeria 1.10 Bolivia 3.87
Lesotho 1.14 Suriname 4.05
Papua New Guinea 1.18 Guinea 4.10
Portugal 1.18 South Africa 4.31
Nicaragua 1.21 Namibia 5.00
Solomon Islands 1.21 Trinidad and Tobago 5.78
Kyrgyz Republic 1.31 Czech Republic 5.82
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1.34 Iceland 5.96
Venezuela, RB 1.37 Italy 6.32
Malawi 1.45 Romania 6.72
Finland 1.49 Bulgaria 7.25
Burkina Faso 1.56 Spain 8.42
Zimbabwe 1.59 Tunisia 8.46
Netherlands 1.64 Antigua and Barbuda 8.52
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Note: The normalized ratio for each country is
calculated as the difference between the actual per capita GDP of each country and
that of its synthetic counterpart after 2010 divided by the estimated difference before
2010. The higher this normalized ratio is the larger is the negative impact of a shock
after 2010. *The normalized ratio is only calculated for control countries that
exhibited a negative gap between actual and synthetic GDP per capita after 2010.
26
TABLE A5. t-statistic of the AS coefficient*
Country t-statistic Country t-statistic
Ethiopia 6.00 Venezuela, RB -1.90
Lesotho 1.77 Grenada -1.95
Mozambique 1.31 Zambia -1.96
Botswana 0.91 Zimbabwe -2.00
Chile 0.90 Macedonia, FYR -2.11
Tajikistan 0.58 Togo -2.13
Saudi Arabia 0.40 Fiji -2.22
Angola 0.40 Guyana -2.28
Dominican Republic 0.27 Comoros -2.58
Korea, Rep. 0.17 Turkey -2.60
Georgia 0.17 United Kingdom -2.64
Armenia 0.09 Burundi -2.73
Sweden 0.07 Puerto Rico -2.76
Australia -0.01 Mauritania -2.90
Poland -0.10 Denmark -2.96
Papua New Guinea -0.16 Niger -3.24
United States -0.35 Cameroon -3.33
Moldova -0.40 Tanzania -3.44
Guinea-Bissau -0.61 El Salvador -3.63
Tonga -0.62 Senegal -3.71
Costa Rica -0.65 Benin -4.15
Chad -0.71 Bolivia -4.16
Nigeria -0.74 Cote d'Ivoire -4.20
Belize -0.78 Suriname -4.22
Paraguay -0.83 Pakistan -4.29
Nicaragua -0.83 Madagascar -4.67
Finland -0.92 Guinea -4.88
Congo, Dem. Rep. -0.94 South Africa -4.94
Burkina Faso -0.96 Czech Republic -5.11
Portugal -1.00 Trinidad and Tobago -5.27
Djibouti -1.03 Romania -5.53
Netherlands -1.04 Namibia -5.55
Malawi -1.07 Iceland -5.99
New Zealand -1.09 Bulgaria -6.20
Kyrgyz Republic -1.25 Italy -6.69
Congo, Rep. -1.27 Antigua and Barbuda -8.18
Uganda -1.32 Tunisia -8.70
Solomon Islands -1.44 Spain -8.77
Source: Authors’ own calculations. Note: The lower is the t-statistic the more
statistically significant is the impact of the events that happened between
2011 and 2013 on the respective economy. *We only report the t-statistics
for countries that had a negative gap between the actual and synthetic per
capita GDP after 2010.
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Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Note: AS is a dummy variable representing the Arab Spring that takes 1 from
2011 onward and 0 otherwise. AS(2011) is a dummy variable that takes 1 for
2011 and 0 otherwise. AS(2012) is a dummy variable that takes 1 for 2012
and 0 otherwise. AS(2013) is a dummy variable that takes 1 for 2013 and 0
otherwise.
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TABLE A7. t-statistic of the AS coefficient*
Tunisia SyntheticTunisia
GCF average 1990-2000 26.0 26.0
GCF average 2001-2010 24.3 24.4
Consumption average 1990-2000 78.1 78.1
Consumption average 2001-2010 78.5 78.5
Imports average 1990-2000 45.1 45.1
Imports average 2001-2010 48.8 48.8
Exports average 1990-2000 41.0 41.0
Exports average 2001-2010 45.9 45.9
Agriculture 1990-2000 14.9 16.3
Agriculture 2001-2010 9.7 11.5
Services 1990-2000 53.3 53.0
Services 2001-2010 60.2 55.0
Life Expectancy at birth (years) 72.5 67.2
Secondary School Enrollment (%) 70.6 69.8
GDP per capita average 1990-1994 (US$) 5,810 5,813
GDP per capita average 1995-1999 (US$) 6,636 6,651
GDP per capita average 2000-2004 (US$) 7,895 7,888
GDP per capita average 2005-2010 (US$) 9,656 9,652
Net Fuel Exports 1990-2000 -0.2 0.0
Net Fuel Exports 2001-2010 -1.2 -0.6
Ores and Metal Exports 1990-2000 0.4 1.7
Ores and Metal Exports 2001-2010 0.5 2.5
Source: Authors’ own calculations. *All variables are in percentage of
GDP (%) unless stated otherwise. After adding net fuel exports and ores
and metal exports, the control countries (with their corresponding
weights) that compose Synthetic Tunisia are: Guinea-Bissau (0.1%),
Grenada (0.3%), Malaysia (0.6%), Zimbabwe (1.4%), Seychelles (3%),
Peru (3.6%), Belarus (6%), Korea, Rep. (6.6%), India (7.9%), Congo, Rep.
(8.2%), Guinea (9.4%), Belize (12%), Mauritius (18.6%), Sri Lanka
(22.3%).
29
TABLE A8. Decomposition of GDP Growth Rate from the Demand Side
Growth (%) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Real GDP 4.3 4.8 1.7 5.5 6.0 4.0 5.7 6.3 4.5 3.1 3.0 -1.9 3.9 2.4
Imports of Goods and Services 7.0 13.7 -3.0 0.3 2.7 0.0 7.6 9.6 5.4 -8.2 15.3 -2.4 5.4 -1.8
Exports of Goods and Services 5.8 11.7 -3.5 0.0 5.5 4.5 4.3 11.8 2.8 -7.0 10.6 -4.3 4.3 1.9
Total Consumption, of which 5.5 5.3 4.1 5.2 5.0 4.4 5.0 5.5 4.7 4.0 4.1 4.5 4.6 3.2
Public 9.9 2.8 6.3 7.4 4.3 2.8 7.0 5.5 4.4 5.8 3.7 6.1 5.2 4.3
Private 4.3 6.0 3.5 4.6 5.2 4.8 4.5 5.5 4.8 3.6 4.3 4.1 4.4 3
Total Investment 4.3 8.4 -1.7 -1.8 1.0 2.7 9.5 6.3 5.3 3.5 4.3 -12.7 6.1 0.2
Source: National Institute of Statistics.
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TABLE A9. Share of Total Real Exports (%)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Exports of Goods and Services 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Exports of Goods (FOB); of which: 72.3 73.1 75.5 76.1 72.4 73.9 78.9 76.4 77.2
Mining Exports 5.1 4.9 5.6 10.7 6.2 6.8 4.1 4.7 4.6
Other Exports 67.3 68.3 69.9 65.4 66.2 67.1 74.8 71.6 72.6
Exports of Services; of which: 27.7 26.9 24.5 23.9 27.6 26.1 21.1 23.6 22.8
Tourism 13.8 13.3 12.0 10.9 12.9 11.1 7.6 9.1 9.0
Other Services 13.9 13.6 12.5 12.9 14.7 15.0 13.5 14.5 13.8
Source: National Institute of Statistics and authors’ own calculations.
